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THE CANADIAN BILL ®F RiGHTs-"EQLTALITY BEFORE THE
A.-G. CAN. V. LAVELL .-

LAw"-

The Decision.

The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 14 .-G. Can.

v. Lavell' is a weak response to a question which generated

great public interest because of its implications for Indians, for
women and for the continued vitality of the Canadian Bill of
Rights' guarantee of "equality before the law" . The case concerned section 12 (1) (b) of the Indian Act.' This section provides
that an Indian woman who marries "a person who is not an
Indian" is not entitled to be "registered as an Indian". The
Registrar, an official in the Department of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development, has the power to delete from "the Indian Register" the name of any Indian woman who has married
a non-Indian man.' By contrast, when an Indian man marries
a non-Indian woman, the man does not lose his Indian status ;
instead, his wife acquires Indian status' Thus the Indian Act
treats Indian women and Indian men quite differently in the
same circumstances of marriage to a non-Indian .
The Lavell case was an appeal from two judgments . The first
concerned Mrs. Lavell, who was a "status Indian" (an Indian
within the meaning of the Indian Act) until she married a non
Indian. Her name was deleted from the Indian Register by the
Registrar. She had not been living on a reserve for nine years
prior to her marriage, and she did not claim to have been deprived of any property rights by the Registrar's decision. She
appealed from the decision to a County Court judge under section
9(3) of the Indian Act ; he upheld the decision of the Registrar.'
She then appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal, which reversed

'

(1973), 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481 .
2 R.S.C., 1970, c. I-6.
' Ibid., s. 7.
'Ibid., s. 11(î)(f) .
' (1971), 22 D.L.R . (3d) 182.
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the County Court judge on the ground that section 12 (1) (b)
was inoperative by reason of conflict with the right to "equality
before the law" in section 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights .'
The second case concerned Mrs. Bedard, who was also a status
Indian until she married a non-Indian in 1964 . She separated from
her husband in 1970, and returned to the reserve to live in a house
which had been left to her under her mother's will. When she
returned to the reserve the band council required her to dispose
of the property and gave her permission to remain on the reserve
only until she had disposed of the property. She disposed of the
property to her brother, but he allowed her to continue to live in
the house. The band council then resolved that the regional supervisor should be requested to serve a notice to quit the reserve on
Mrs. Bedard. She responded by commencing an action for an
injunction restraining the band council from expelling her from
the reserve and claiming some other relief as well. Osler J. in the
Supreme Court of Ontario granted the injunction ; he followed
the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in the Lavell case
and held section 12(b) to be inoperative as in conflict with the
Bill of Rights .'
On appeal from both decisions, the Supreme Court of Canada,
by the narrow majority of five to four, reversed the decisions of
the Federal Court of Appeal and of Osler J., and held that section
12 (1) (b) was not in conflict with the right to "equality before the
law" in the Bill of Rights ; it was therefore an operative provision,
and Mrs. Lavell and Mrs. Bedard had legally lost their status as
Indians. The principal majority opinion was written by Ritchie
J. It will be recalled that it was Ritchie J. who wrote the principal
majority opinion in R . v. Drybones,' the first and so far still the
only case in which the Supreme Court of Canada has held a statute
to be inoperative for conflict with the Bill of Rights . Ritchie J.
in Lavell is careful to reaffirm his earlier decision that the Bill of
Rights does have the effect of rendering inoperative statutes which
conflict with its precepts.' But he concludes in Lavell that section
12 (1) (b) is not in conflict with the Bill of Rights and that the
Drybones doctrine is therefore inapplicable. He offers essentially
two arguments in support of this result, which I have called "the
British North America Act argument" and "the Dicey argument".
Each of these arguments is considered later in this comment.
Ritchie J.'s opinion was concurred in by Fauteux C.J., Martland
and Judson JJ. The fifth vote was provided by Pigeon J. who had
(1971), 22 D .L.R. (3d) 188 .
7 Bedard v . Isaac, [197212 O .R . 391 ; 25 D .L.R. (3d) 551 .
'[19701 S .C.R . 282 ; 9 D .L .R. (3d) 473 .
9
Supra, footnote 1., at p . 494.
6
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dissented in Drybones. He wrote a short opinion agreeing in the
result with Ritchie J., but dissociating himself from Ritchie J.'s
reasoning. Pigeon J. made no attempt to determine whether or not
section 12(l) (b) was in conflict with the Bill of Rights (although
he implied that he thought it was) . He avoided the issue by persisting in the view he had expressed in dissent in Drybones that
the Bill of Bights does not in any event override inconsistent legislation . Section 12(l) (b) was therefore operative, whether or not
it conflicted with the Bill of Rights.
The principal dissenting opinion was written by Laskin J. as
he then was. He argued that there was no distinction between
Drybones and Lavell and that section 12 (1) (b) was in conflict
with the equality guarantee in the Bill of Bights and was inoperative. Laskin J.'s opinion was concurred in by Hall and Spence JJ.
Abbott J. wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he agreed
with Laskin J. and added some comments of his own, including the
striking statements that the Bill of Rights "has substantially affected the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament", and that such
a result is "undesirable"." Abbott J., like Pigeon J., had been
one of the three dissenters in I)rybones (the third one being
Cartwright C.J.) who held that the Bill of Rights could not override inconsistent statutes . It is perhaps surprising that he apparently did not feel free to join Pigeon J. in persisting in this dissenting
view, since in no decision after Drybones had the Bill of flights
actually been given the effect of rendering a statute inoperative .
As a digression it may be noticed that Abbott J.'s opinions in
three important civil liberties cases are very difficult to reconcile
with each other. It will be recalled that it was Abbott J. in
Switzman v. Elbling," the famous padlock case, who stated, obiter,
that there was a bill of rights implied in the British North America
Act, whereby neither Parliament nor the legislatures, could abrogate the freedoms of expression and debate which were essential
to the working of a parliamentary democracy. This opinion appeared to reflect a strong view of the desirability of limiting legislative supremacy by a bill of rights, because there is no such bill
of rights explicit in the .British North America Act, and no other
judge of the Supreme Court of Canada has been prepared to assert clearly that one should be implied. Then in Drybones" when
Abbott J. was given the opportunity to join the majority in holding that the explicit Canadian Bill of Rights was a "true" bill of
rights with overriding effect on inconsistent statutes he rejected the
opportunity and held that the Bill of Bights was merely a canon of
i° Ibid., at p . 484 .
" [19571 S.C.R. 285, at p. 328 .
12 Supra, footnote 8, at pp . 299 (S.C .

), 477
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construction . Now in Lavell Abbott J. asserts that the Bill of
Rights "has substantially affected the doctrine of the supremacy
of Parliament" (this is inconsistent with his Drybones opinion),
and that such a result is "undesirable" (this is inconsistent with
his Switzman v. Elbling opinion) .
The British North America Act Argument .

Ritchie J.'s first reason for upholding section 12(1)(b) is
summarized in his own words :"
. . . that the Bill of Rights is not effective to render inoperative legisla-

tion, such as s. 12(1)(b) of the Indian Act, passed by the Parliament
of Canada in discharge of its constitutional function under s. 91(24)
of the B.N .A . Act, to specify how and by whom Crown lands reserved
for Indians are to be used .

Early in his judgment he emphasized that section 91(24) of the
British North America Act assigned to the federal Parliament the
subject of "Indians, and Lands reserved for [the] Indians" ." This
authority "could not have been effectively exercised without enacting laws establishing the qualifications required to entitle persons
to status as Indians and to the use and benefit of Crown `lands
reserved for Indians ", .'S The Bill of Rights "has [not] rendered
Parliament powerless to exercise the authority entrusted to it under
the Constitution";` and "it is not effective to amend or in any
way alter the terms of the B .N.A . Act" ."
This argument, which I have called the British North America
Act argument, may perhaps be best understood by looking at another case, Canard v. A .-G. Can.," a decision of the Manitoba
Court of Appeal written by Dickson J.A. (who has of course since
been elevated to the Supreme Court of Canada) . In Canard the
court was concerned with section 43 of the Indian Act, a provision
which gives to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development jurisdiction to appoint the executors and administrators
of the estates of deceased Indians. For non-Indians that jurisdiction exists in the Surrogate Court (or other probate court) of the
province in which the deceased is domiciled (or in which he leaves
land) at the time of death. Dickson J.A., in an opinion which was
agreed to by the other members of the court (Guy and Hall M.A .),
held that section 43 was in conflict with the Bill of Rights because
it denied "equality before the law" to the Indians; it was "a legal
roadblock in the way of one particular racial group, placing that

'$ Supra, footnote 1, at pp . 499-500.
2'Ibid., at p. 489.
is Ibid ., at p. 490 .
is Ibid.
17
Ibid ., at p. 489.
11 (1972), 30 D.L .R. (3d) 9. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court
of Canada was granted on October 16th, 1972 .
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racial group in a position of inequality before the law;" it was
therefore inoperative. The learned judge also cast doubt on the
other succession rules in the Indian Act."
This decision has always seemed to me to be wrong. Let us
assume that there is a disadvantage to Indians in having their
estates administered by the Minister of Indian Affairs instead of
by the Surrogate Court. Section 91(24) of the British North
America Act assigns legislative power over "Indians, and Lands
reserved for the Indians" to the federal Parliament . It thereby
envisages that legislation upon matters which would otherwise be
within provincial competence, for instance, succession on death,
can be enacted by the federal Parliament so long as it is in relation
to "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians". Obviously, the
rules of the Indian Act concerning succession on death will apply
only to Indians, for if they applied to any wider class of persons
they would be unconstitutional . And, equally obviously, those
rules will differ from the rules applicable to non-Indians, because
the rules for Indians can only be enacted federally, while the rules
for non-Indians can only be enacted provincially. To say that the
rules of the Indian Act deny "equality before the law" because
they are harsher than the provincial rules is to ignore the federal
character of Canada . It is like saying that an Ontario law denies
equality before the law because it is harsher than the comparable
Quebec law. The essential feature of federalism is that it will
accommodate differences of this kind .
The Bill of Rights could be interpreted as abolishing all special
rules for Indians, or at least those which place Indians in a position
which is disadvantageous in comparison with non-Indians." This
point of view does not involve the proposition "that the Mill has
rendered Parliament powerless to exercise the authority entrusted
to it under the constitution", or the proposition that the Bill is
effective to "amend" or "alter" the terms of the British North
America Act. These suggestions by Ritchie Jr . (quoted earlier in
this comment) are clearly erroneous. A voluntary withdrawal by
Parliament from a field entrusted to it under the constitution does
not render Parliament "powerless" to re-enter that field; nor does
it "amend" or "alter" the British North America Act. That Act
does not impose a duty to enact special laws for the Indians; it
does not compel Parliament or the legislatures to exercise any of
their legislative powers to the full, or even at all. It is not
necessary to set up itchie J .'s straw men in order to reject the
is Ibid., at p. 23 .
Ibid., at p. 22.
21
This was in fact the decision of Osler Y. in Isaac v. Davey, [19731 3
0.R. 677; 38 D.L .R. (3d) 23 . A dictum of Laskin J.'s in Lavell, supra,
footnote 1, at pp. 511-512, suggests that he also holds this point of view.
20
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argument that the Bill of Rights prohibits special laws for Indians.
What seems to me to be wrong with the argument is that it is not
plausible. There is no need to construe the vague phrase "equality
before the law" as requiring such a radical result as the abolition
of laws enacted by the federal Parliament which employ a racial
classification when the use of that classification is essential to
the validity of the laws under the British North America Act. It
is much more plausible to construe the guarantee of equality as
not intended to disturb the federal principle: inequalities between
the laws of different legislative bodies within the federation should
be deemed not to be inconsistent with equality before the law."
If we accept that the guarantee of equality before the law
should be qualified by the federal principle of diversity between
legislative jurisdictions, then we have to conclude that Drybones
was wrongly decided. The only reason why section 94(b) (now
section 95 (b) ) of the Indian Act was held inoperative was because
it imposed a "harsher" liquor law on Indians than the law applicable to non-Indians . The difficulty with this reasoning was
clearly stated by Pigeon J. in his dissenting judgment in Drybones.
The "very object" of section 91(24) of the British North America
Act, he said, "in so far as it relates to Indians, as opposed to
Lands reserved for the Indians, is to enable the Parliament of
Canada to make legislation applicable only to Indians as such
and therefore not applicable to Canadian citizens generally" ."
" Katz, The Indian Act and Equality Before the Law (1973), 6 Ottawa

L. Rev. 277 agrees with this proposition, but he argues that the Indian Act
may nevertheless be in violation of "equality before the law". He would
compare its provisions, not with provincial laws, but with the absence of
similar federal laws for non-Indians ; and where Parliament has no power
to enact similar federal laws for non-Indians then he would compare the
Indian Act provisions with the laws of the federal territories, even though
the facts may arise far away from either of the territories. These arguments, while ingenious, seem to me to be unrealistic. The absence of
federal laws in a field where the Parliament has power to enact laws may
be explained by the existence of satisfactory provincial laws (which Katz
will not use for purposes of comparison), or at least by a provincial occupation of the field which it is not politically feasible for the federal
Parliament to disturb. The territorial laws are not a realistic basis for
comparison either, because they are enacted for each territory not by the
federal Parliament but by the local, mainly elected, Territorial Council (see
next footnote) ; and although the power of each Council is merely delegated
from the Parliament, there are obvious political constraints against direct
federal parliamentary intervention in the local government of each territory.
23
Supra, footnote 8, at pp. 303 (S.C .R .), 489 (D .L.R .) . The only possible escape from this argument lies in the fact that Drybolaes arose in the
Northwest Territories over which the federal Parliament has full legislative
authority under an 1871 amendment to the B.N.A . Act. In fact, however,
the federal Parliament has delegated to a Territorial Council legislative
powers equivalent to those of a provincial Legislature : Northwest Territories Act, R.S .C ., 1970, c. N-22, s. 13 ; the Yukon Territory Act, R.S .C.,
1970, c. Y-2, s. 16, is similar. The result is that the territorial ordinances
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Ritchie J. in his majority judgment in Drybones did not attempt
to answer this criticism. Now in Lavell we learn what his answer
is : Drybones, we are told, was concerned with "conduct by Indians
off a reserve" ; Z.avell, on the other hand, is concerned with "the
internal regulation of the lives of Indians on Reserves of their right
z4
to the use and benefits of Crown lands thereon" The emphasis
of "off" and "on" in these quotations is Ritchie I.'s own, and
throughout his reasons for judgment he emphasizes that the Lavell
case is concerned with the property and civil rights of Indians "on
reserves".25
Ritchie I.'s characterization of the issue in Lavell seems to
me to be both wrong and irrelevant . The reason why it is wrong
is that the issue in the case was whether or not Mrs . Lavell and
Mrs. Bedard had been -lawfully deprived of their status as Indians.
Indian status certainly, does carry with it the right to reside on,
and acquire property in, a reserve, but it carries non-reserve consequences as well . Sections 42 to 52 make detailed provisions with
respect to the property of Indians-all property whether situate
on a reserve or not, and all Indians whether residing on a reserve
or not. Thus, as we noticed in the Canard case, probate jurisdiction
over the estates of deceased Indians is exercised by the Minister
of Indian Affairs and Northern Development." The Minister has
power to "declare the will of an Indian to be void in whole or in
part" if he is satisfied of any one of a number of matters, including
such extraordinary grounds as that the terms of the will are"vague,
uncertain or capricious" or are "against the public interest"." If
an Indian dies intestate, the scheme of distribution of his estate
is laid down in the Indian Act;' that scheme differs very substantially from the Ontario scheme, for example. There are provisions
for the administration of the property of mentally incompetent
Indians and infant Indians;" these provisions, like the other property and, succession rules, apply to Indians and their property
off as well as on reserves . Then, moving away from the private
property rules, we find that the Act authorizes payments of money
to Indians and the provision of services to Indians, . and that these
provisions are not always confined to Indians living on reserves ."
Then there is section 95, the section held to be inoperative in
may be expected to differ from federal statutes in exactly the same way
as provincial laws . In Canard this particular complication is not present,
for the case arose not in a federal territory but in the province of Manitoba;
but see Katz, op . tit., footnote 22, ibid .
24 ,Supra, footnote 1, at p.
499.
25
See ibid., at pp . 490, 492, 495, 498 .
25 Indian Act, supra, footnote 2, ss 42-44.
27 lbid., s. 46.
25 Ibid ., ss 48-50.
29 Ibid., ss 51, 52 .
5° Ibid., ss. 61-73
.
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Drybones (then section 94), making drunkenness (as well as

possession or manufacture of intoxicants) off a reserve an offence
for Indians. The provisions concerning educational require Indian
children to attend "such school as the Minister may designate",
and they provide for the appointment and empowering of truant
officers ; these obligations are not confined to Indian children
living on reserves, and the designated school need not be on a
reserve. It is worth noting that the parent or guardian of a truant
Indian child commits an offence under section 119 of the Act,
so that Ritchie J. seems to be wrong when he says that "a careful reading of the Act discloses that section 95 (formerly 94) is
the only provision therein made which creates an offence for any
behaviour of an Indian off a reserve" ." It is surely plain that
the issue for Mrs. Lavell and Mrs. Bedard was not exclusively
concerned with their rights on reserves ; the deprivation of Indian
status was much wider than that.
Even if the Lavell case could be characterized in the narrow
fashion attempted by Ritchie J. this would still not make the case
materially different from Drybones. Section 91(24) of the British
North America Act empowers the federal Parliament to legislate
for "Indians, and lands reserved for the Indians" . There are two
heads of power here : "Indians" and "Lands reserved for the
Indians" . The distinction may be seen in the drunkenness provisions
of the Indian Act. Thus section 95, making drunkenness an offence
off a reserve, has to employ a racial classification and apply to "an
Indian"; section 97, making drunkenness an offence on a reserve,
need not employ a racial classification and it applies to "a person". If a distinction is to be drawn, the British North America
Act argument applies with more force to those provisions of the
Indian Act which apply off reserves . Such provisions are constitutional only if they are laws in relation to "Indians"; here the
British North America Act seems to insist upon a racial classification, as the draftsman of section 95 clearly concluded. Provisions
which apply on reserves are constitutional if they are in relation
to "Lands reserved for the Indians" ; it is possible to make some
provisions for lands reserved for the Indians without using a racial
classification, as the language of section 97 demonstrates ." An
argument might be constructed (which would not in my view
be very strong) for the proposition that provisions employing a
racial classification which apply off reserves do not offend the
11 Ibid ., ss 114-123.
92 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 498 .
"In R. v. White-an, (19711 2 W.W.R . 316, McClelland D.C.J .
(Sask.) refused to hold s. 97 (then s. 96) inoperative on the ground
that, unlike s. 95 (then s. 94) which had been held inoperative in Drybones, s. 97 did not employ a racial classification .

19741

Comments

271

ill of Rights, but provisions employing a racial classification
which apply on reserves do offend the Bill of Rights . Ritchie J.'s
proposition is the exact reverse of this . It cannot be supported,
and it cannot therefore provide a basis for distinguishing Drybones
from Lavell.
I have taken the view that an analysis of "the British North
America Act argument" is justified because it will obviously be
of great significance in testing other parts of the Indian Act. The
fact that it is relied upon by Ritchie J. stimulated the discussion .
ut in my view the argument is totally irrelevant to the issue in
Lavell, and was not even worthy of mention in the case . The
ritish North America Act argument is that where the Act uses
a particular classification in order to confer legislative jurisdiction
on the federal parliament then the use by the federal parliament
of that classification should not be deemed in violation of the
"equality before the law" guarantee in the Bill of Rights . Thus a
law in relation to "aliens"' should not be deemed in violation of
equality before the law because it treats aliens more harshly than
British subjects or citizens . A law in relation to "savings banks"'
should not be deemed in violation of equality before the law because it treats savings banks more harshly than insurance companies . But as soon as parliament employs a classification which
is different from that contained in the British North -America Act's
grant of power, then the law does have to meet the test of equality .
Thus a law which treats black aliens differently from white aliens
would undoubtedly be in violation of the equality guarantee; a
law which prohibits savings banks from accepting deposits from
Roman Catholics would also be in violation. In these examples
it is no answer to say that parliament is exercising its authority over
aliens and savings banks ; it is the classification by colour and
religion which is offensive and those classifications are not built
into the British North America Act. Indeed, parliament is always
legislating in exercise of some power conferred by the British
North America Act; if that fact alone exempted its products from
the Bill of Rights, then the Bill of Rights could never be effective.
This rather obvious fallacy is the principal (though not the
only) vice in Ritchie J.'s use of the British North America Act
argument to sustain section 12 (b) of the Indian Act in Lavell .
He says that the provision is not offensive to "equality" because
its rule was "imposed in discharge of parliament's constitutional
function under section 91(24)" " put Mrs. Lavell and Mrs. Bedard
did not claim to be discriminated against by reason of the fact that
94
as
se

B.N .A . Act, s. 91(25) .
Ibid ., s. 91(16) .
Supra, footnote 1, at p. 490.
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they were Indians; if that had been their complaint then Ritchie
J. could have replied that that kind of discrimination is inherent
in the grant of legislative power over Indians in section 91 (24)
of the British North America Act. What Mrs. Lavell and Mrs.
Bedard complained of was discrimination by reason of the fact that
they were women. If the British North America Act had granted
power over "Indian women" the same reply would have been
available to his Lordship . But the British North America Act in
fact confers power over "Indians"; it is obvious that Indians is a
term which is regardless of sex and that therefore sexual discrimination is not inherent in that grant of power. It is therefore a
massive red herring to justify section 12(b) of the Indian Act on
the ground that it was enacted in exercise of authority conferred
by section 91(24) . A provision of the Indian Act which can be
justified on that ground is section 95, dealing with drunkenness
by an "Indian"; but in Drybones, as we have noticed, Ritchie J.
himself wrote the majority judgment of the Supreme Court of
Canada holding section 95 (then section 94) to be inoperative
as in conflict with the equality guarantee. Another provision is
section 43, dealing with the estates of deceased "Indians" ; but in
Canard, as we have noticed, Dickson J.A., now one of Ritchie
J.'s colleagues on the Supreme Court, wrote the unanimous judgment of the Manitoba Court of Appeal holding section 43 to be
inoperative as in conflict with the equality guarantee .
My conclusion is that the British North America Act argument
is sound, but inconsistent with the decision in Drybones and irrelevant to the issue in Lavell. Ritchie J.'s first reason for his
decision in Lavell is therefore unsatisfactory.
The Dicey Argument .

Let us now turn to Ritchie J.'s second reason for upholding
section 12 (l) (b) . It is summarized in his own words:`
. . . that equality before the law under the Bill of Rights means equality

of treatment in the enforcement and application of the laws of Canada
before the law enforcement authorities and the ordinary courts of the
land, and no such inequality is necessarily entailed in the construction
and application of s. 12(l)(b) .

This definition of equality before the law is taken from Dicey's
famous definition of the "rule of law". In The Law of the Constitution, written in 1885, Dicey described "the rule of law" as one
of the two leading characteristics of the English constitution, the
other being the sovereignty of Parliament . He offered three definitions of the rule of law; the second of these was "the universal
37 Ibid., at p. 500. The quoted passage is actually his third reason, but
the second reason is an obiter dictum .
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subjection of all classes to one law administered by the ordinary
courts"." According to Ritchie J., it is Dicey's second meaning
of the rule of law which is embodied in the Bill of Rights guarantee
of equality before the law: s9

. "equality before the law" as recognized by Dicey as a segment of
the rule of law, carries the meaning of equal subjection of all classes
to the ordinary law of the land as administered by the ordinary courts,
and in my opinion the phrase "equality before the law" as employed in,
section 1(b) of the Bill of Rights is to be treated as meaning equality
in the administration or application of the law by the law enforcement
authorities and the ordinary courts of the land.
. .

Ritchie J. goes on to assert that section 12 (1) (b) of the Indian
Act does not involve any such inequality in the administration or
application of the law. The sum total of the reasoning on this
point is contained in a passage which attempts to distinguish
Drybones from the present case-'
The fundamental distinction between the present case and that of Drybones,. however, appears to me to be that the impugned section in the
latter case could not be enforced without denying equality of treatment
in the administration and enforcement of the law before the ordinary
courts of the land to a racial group, whereas no such inequality of
treatment between Indian men and women flows as a necessary result
of the application of s . 12 (1) (b) of the Indian Act .

The first point to be made about the Dicey argument is that
Dicey would turn in his grave if he knew that his language was
being used as a gloss on a bill of rights. Ritchie J. does not refer
to Dicey',s third meaning of the rule of law, but his third meaning
is that civil liberties "are with us the result of judicial decisions
determining the rights of private persons in particular cases brought
before the courts"; whereas under many foreign constitutions
civil liberties are protected by a bill of rights in the constitution .
It must also be remembered that Dicey in the same book described
and extolled the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament, under
which Parliament "can make or unmake any law whatever; and
further, that no person or body is recognized by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of
Parliament" .` It was Dicey's view that the great strength of the
English constitution lay in the absence of any bill of rights or
other constitutional restraint on legislative power. His second
meaning of the rule of law (the one relied on by Ritchie J.) was
intended to show how civil liberties were protected in England
without a bill of rights . They were protected because anyone inas (l0th ed., by E . C . S . Wade, 1965), p . 193 .
ss Supra footnote 1, at p . 495 .
4° Ibid.,
at p. 499 .
41 Op. cit., footnote 38, pp . 195-196 .
IIbid ., p . 40.
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jured by a high official could sue that official for redress under
the ordinary law in the ordinary courts . The point of equality before the law was that "with us every official, from the Prime
Minister down to a constable or a collector of taxes, is under the
same responsibility for every act done without legal justification
as any other citizen" .' And he contrasted this happy situation
with countries where "nobles, priests and others could defy the
law",' or even the France of his own time, which subjected official acts to a special system of law, namely, "official law administered by official bodies".' There is no need to repeat the
many criticisms which have been made of Dicey's concept of the
rule of law.' It is enough for our purpose to say that his concept
of the rule of law cannot be enshrined in a bill of rights which
overrides statutes, because a salient characteristic of the concept
is that it is not enshrined in a bill of rights, or at least that it does
nor in any degree disturb the sovereignty of Parliament. According
to Ritchie J. it was the Diceyan definition which led to section
95 of the Indian Act being held inoperative in Drybones."' Such
a result would have been anathema to Dicey. In Dicey's scheme,
a provision of an Act of Parliament had to be applied without
question by the courts ; Drybones' civil liberties would be adequately protected by the fact that he was tried in the ordinary courts ;
equality before the law would be irrelevant to the Drybones facts,
but would involve the proposition that an Indian holding an official position (for instance, a cabinet minister or the chief of a
band) would be subject to the same drunkenness law as Drybones.
One must conclude that Ritchie J. is wrong in believing that
his definition of equality before the law is taken from Dicey. However, that does not prove that there is anything wrong with it. Let
us therefore examine it on its own merits . The definition is "equality of treatment in the enforcement and application of the laws
of Canada before the law enforcement authorities and the ordinary
courts of the land".' The example of its application, we are told,
is Drybones, where "the impugned section could not be enforced
without denying equality [in the sense defined] ; on the other hand,
we are told, the impugned section in Lavell does not lead to any
such inequality"."
A possible meaning of equality in the "enforcement and ap43 Ibid., p . 193.
" Ibid
., 'p. 194.
45 Ibid., p . 195.
41 The best-known of many criticisms is perhaps Jennings, The Law
and the Constitution (5th ed., 1959), chapters 1, 2, 6 and Appendix II.
"See quotation accompanying footnote 40, supra.
'$ See quotation accompanying footnote 37, supra.
41 See quotation accompanying footnote 40, supra .
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plication" of the law is that any given law should be administered
or applied impartially to those persons to whom the law applies.
In this sense the guarantee of equality would govern the conduct
of the officials or courts charged with the enforcement of the law
and would exclude bias, discrimination, or bad faith on their part.
In this sense the concept would be agreeable to Dicey, for it would
never result in the upsetting of the law itself . In the context of
section 12(1)(b) of the Indian Act, this definition of equality
would be satisfied if Mrs. Lavell and Mrs. Bedard were treated
in the same way as other Indian women who marry non-Indians.
In the context of section 95 of the Indian Act, equality in this sense
would be satisfied if Drybones were treated in the same way as
other Indians found similarly intoxicated in like circumstances;
so long as the law was applied or enforced fairly, the Bill of Rights
would be satisfied. This is exactly what was decided prior to
Drybones by a majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal
in R. v. Gonzales." In Drybones Ritchie J. emphatically rejected
this holding. He pointed out (perfectly correctly) "that the most
glaring discriminatory legislation against a racial group would have
to be construed as recognizing the right of each of its individual
members `to equality before the law', so long as all the other members are being discriminated against in the same way" .' And of
course the actual decision in Drybones was inconsistent with this
"administrative" definition of equality, because the Supreme Court
of Canada held that Drybones had been denied equality before
the law, although there was no suggestion that enforcing officers
or courts had treated Drybones differently from other persons to
whom the impugned law applied, that is, other Indians; and the
Supreme Court distinctly held that the law itself, and not merely
enforcement. practice, was inoperative . So much for the definition
of equality as requiring only equality of enforcement or administration.
It is clear that Ritchie J. in Lavell is not repenting of his decision in Drybones. He expressly states in Lavell, in a passage I
quoted earlier, that the impugned law in Drybones "could not be
enforced without denying equality of treatment in the administration and enforcement of the law before the ordinary courts of the
land to a racial group" ." In what sense is this true? If a white
man had been found with Drybones in the lobby of the Old Stope
Hotel at Yellowknife in a similar state of intoxication, then the
white man could not have been charged under the Indian Act; he
would have to have been charged under the Liquor Ordinance of
50 (1962), 32 19.1 ...8. (2d) 290.
si Supra, footnote 8, at pp. 297 (S .C.R .), 484 (D .L .R.) .
52 See quotation accompanying footnote 40, supra.
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the Northwest Territories." Under the Liquor Ordinance there is no
minimum penalty, and the maximum penalty is thirty days imprisonment ; under the Indian Act there is a minimum penalty of a
$10.00 fine and a maximum penalty of three months imprisonment . In fact Drybones was sentenced to the minimum fine of
$10.00. The fine seems modest, and our hypothetical white man
could have been given exactly the same (or a heavier) penalty.
But it is also possible that the white man could be sentenced to a
lesser fine than $10.00 whereas the Indian could be penalized
no less than $10.00 .54 The most that can be said in favour of
Drybones' claim that he had been denied equality is that a white
man in like circumstances could have been sentenced to a lesser
penalty than Drybones. It must therefore be this possibility of a
lesser penalty for a white man which is what Ritchie J. regards as
a denial of "equality of treatment in the administration and enforcement of the law".
Now let us look at the Lavell facts. Suppose that an Indian
man married a non-Indian at the same time as Mrs. Lavell (or
Mrs. Bedard) did so. The consequence for the man is that he
retains his Indian status, he remains free to reside on his reserve
and to own property in the reserve, and he remains subject to the
other benefits and burdens of Indian status . The consequence
for the woman is that she loses her Indian status, she loses her
right to reside on her reserve or to own property in the reserve,
and she is denied the other benefits and burdens of Indian status .
Obviously these differences are reflected in the "administration and
enforcement of the law". The law was administered or enforced
against Mrs. Lavell by the Registrar striking her name off the
Indian Register ; had she been a man, the Registrar would not and
could not have struck the name off. The law was administered
or enforced against Mrs. Bedard by the band council forcing her
to sell her house and commencing to expel her from the reserve;
had she been a man, the band council would not and could not
have forced the sale of the house or the expulsion from the reserve.
And, if it is thought to be important, these inequalities of treatment are ultimately enforced in the ordinary courts, as the course
of proceedings in these two cases shows : Mrs. Lavell appealed
" R .O.N.W.T., 1956, c. 60, s. 19.

"Another difference between the Liquor Ordinance and the Indian Act
is that the Liquor Ordinance makes drunkenness an offence only "in a
public place", while the Indian Act makes it an offence anywhere "off a
reserve" . Ritchie J. in Drybones, supra, footnote 8, at pp . 290 (S.C .R.),
478-479 (D.L.R .), treats this difference as important, but a glance at the
Liquor Ordinance (ibid., s. 2(1)(e)) reveals that the lobby of an hotel
(where Drybones committed his offence) would be a "public place" within
the meaning of the Liquor Ordinance, so that Drybones could not rely on
that particular inequality .
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the Registrar's decision into the ordinary (federal) court system ;
Mrs . Bedard sought an injunction from the ordinary (provincial)
superior court. If Mrs. Lavell and Mrs. Bedard had chosen not
to take any legal initiative, but had refused to accept their loss
of status, their loss of status would ultimately have been enforced
by the courts, probably in legal proceedings to remove them from
the reserves, but at the very latest on their deaths, when the question would arise (as it did in the Canard case mentioned earlier)
whether the Surrogate Court or the Minister of Indian Affairs
had jurisdiction to administer their, estates.
The inequality in treatment of Indian men and women which
is required by the Indian Act's status provisions is not materially
different from that authorized by the drunkenness provisions . In
deed, what differences do exist make Lavell a clearer case than
Drybones . ®n the facts of Lavell the status provisions compel
enforcement officers and courts to treat women differently from
men; the officials have no discretion, but are obliged to treat Mrs.
Lavell (or Mrs . Bedard) differently from a man . ®n the facts of
Drybones the drunkenness provisions allow, but do not compel,
the enforcement officers and courts to treat Indians differently
from non-Indians ; the provisions give a sufficiently wide discretion
to enable the officials to treat Drybones in the same way as a
non-Indian . Another difference between the two cases is that the
consequences of discrimination in Drybones were criminal whereas the consequences in Lavell were civil. But no one believes that
criminal consequences are necessarily more severe than civil
consequences, and the Bill of Rights is not confined to criminal
consequences . In fact the civil consequences of a denial of status
are very much more severe than the added penalties for drunkenness . In Drybones the possible discrimination between Indians
and non-Indians could be measured in dollars and cents or clays in
prison . These are not trivial matters, certainly, but they do not
compare in severity with the impact of the denial of Indian status
on a woman who is proud to be an Indian and who wishes to
live with her own people . . A final difference is that the discrimination in Drybones was based on race, whereas the discrimination
in Lavell was based on sex. But section 1 of the Mill of Rights
specifically forbids "discrimination by reason of" either "race"
or "sex". If there is a difference between "race" and "sex" as a
basis for discrimination it is the qualification implicit in section
91(24) of the . British North America Act granting legislative
power over "Indians" ; as we have seen, this suggests that the
"Indian" classification which was in issue in Drybones is admissible ; it does not give any ground for argument that a classification
by sex is admissible.
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The conclusion is that the Diceyan definition of equality before the law, or any other definition which depends upon such
abstractions as inequality in administration or enforcement of thg
law, cannot explain the different results in Drybones and Lavelt.
Reasonableness of Classification .

The crucial question which the court never reached in. its
reasons for judgment in Lavell (or in Drybones for that matter)
is whether there is any rational and acceptable policy justi
fication for the discriminatory provision under review in that
case . In other words, is there any reason to be found in Indian
history or current needs which would justify the defining of
Indian status in a way which discriminates against women? And if
such a reason can be found, it is sufficiently strong to outweigh
the more general community value of the equality of the sexes?
The reason why these questions have to be addressed is that
nearly all laws impose burdens or confer benefits on special groups
in the community, and deny the burdens or benefits to other
groups . The guarantee of "equality before the law" cannot therefore condemn all legislative classifications ; it must condemn only
those which lack acceptable justification in policy. Even such classifications as "race", "national origin" or "sex" (which are enumerated in section 1 of the Bill of Rights) 55 are not necessarily
objectionable. For example, we may want laws which provide
special assistance for disadvantaged groups such as native peoples
(race) and women (sex) ; we may want to confine certain rights
and privileges, such as the vote, to Canadian citizens or British
subjects (national origin) ; we may want to impose disabilities on
aliens or foreign-owned corporations (national origin) ; and there

as The guarantee of "equality before the law" should not however be
confined to laws which classify on the basis of the enumerated classifica-

tions ("race, national origin, colour, religion or sex") for the reasons given
in Sinclair, The Queen v. Drybones (1970), 8 Osgoode Hall L.J . 599, at
p. 615. This appears to me to be what Laskin J. said in Curr v. The Queen,
[19721 S.C.R . 889, at pp . 896-897; 26 D.L.R. (3d) 603, at p. 611. In Lavell,
however, Laskin J., without specifically denying this proposition, relied on
his dictum in Curr as supporting the quite distinct proposition that all
legislative classifications of "race, national origin, colour, religion or sex"
are offensive to the Bill of Rights, and that there is no need to enquire
into their justification : supra, footnote 1, at p. 510 . The same passage from
Curr is quoted and given yet another interpretation (I think) by Ritchie J.
in Lavell in a difficult passage in his reasons for judgment, at p. 492.
It is worth repeating here too that, in my opinion, where the B.N.A.
Act has allocated legislative power by using a classification such as
"Indians" or "Aliens", then the use by the federal Parliament of that
classification is likely to be a prerequisite of validity, and should not be
treated as offensive to the Bill of Rights. In other words the use of a
particular classification in the grant of power in the B.N .A . Act is by itself
a sufficient justification for the use of that classification in a statute enacted
under the grant of power. This is explored earlier in this Comment in the
text headed "The B.N.A . Act Argument".
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may even be physical differences which justify discriminatory
treatment, as in the law of rape, an offence which under the
Criminal Code can only be committed by a man; no doubt, other
examples of "acceptable" discrimination can be found in the
statute books or can be imagined. The need to examine the policy
justification of a law which is alleged to violate the guarantee of
equality emerges clearly from the jurisprudence which has developed around the "equal protection clause" of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution." The mere fact
that a law "discriminates" against a particular group does not
make that law a denial of equal protection ; rather it forces a
judicial enquiry into whether the law's classification is a reasonable means of securing a legitimate legislative purposes'
There is nothing peculiarly American about the doctrine of
reasonable classification . It springs from the inherently "unequal"
nature of legal rules, whether American or Canadian (or Egyptian
for that matter) . Unless the Canadian courts abandon the decision
in Drybones and relinquish the power there assumed to strike
down laws for violation of equality, they must develop some criteria of inequality like the American doctrine of reasonable classification." And yet in Lavell both Ritchie and Laskin Jd., in language which is admittedly not unequivocal, appeared to deny the
relevance of the American doctrine." It is easy to see why they
find such a doctrine unpalatable . It forces the court to leave the
safe area of conventional legal materials, and embark on an enquiry into the rationality and acceptability of policy. The court
does not have the means to acquire the broad range of facts and
policy considerations which are necessary to make a wise judgment as to legislative policy . Nor are the judges equipped by their
legal backgrounds to evaluate "those social, political and economic
considerations which are the raw material of the law maker" ."
Nor are they likely to welcome the public controversy which surrounds the making of community policy, or the public interest
which is taken in the backgrounds and political attitudes of policy" The best-known article among the enormous literature is probably
Tussman and tenBroek, Equal Protection of the Laws (1949), 37 Cal. L.
Rev. 341 ; a more recent, excellent analysis may be found in Note, Legislative s'Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection (1972), 82 Yale L.J. 123.
Formulations vary, and some tend to obscure the policy choices which
are involved : See Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection, ibid.
"Accord: Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of Rights (1966), p. 217;
Sinclair, op . cit., footnote 55, at pp . 614-618; Smith, Regina v. Drybones
and Equality before the Law (1971), 49 Can. Bar Rev . 163 ; Cavalluzzo,
Judicial Review and the -Bill of Rights (1971), 9 Osgoode Hall L.J. 511, at
pp. 544-551; R. N. McLaughlin, Comment (1973), 51 Can . Bar Rev. 517,
at p. 520.
so Supra, footnote 1, at p. 494, per Ritchie J., at p. 510, per Laskin 1.
so
Sinclair, op . cit., footnote 8, at p. 608.
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makers." After the Lavell decision at least one women's group
publicly attacked the court as prejudiced against women." This
hardly fits into the Canadian tradition of civilized legal criticism,
but it is part and parcel of normal political polemic . The Minister
of Justice, Otto Lang, responded with dismay that the Lavell decision "does not indicate a bias against women, but centres on a
technical legal question" ." No doubt the response is correct as to
the court's lack of prejudice against women. But the bit about
technical legal questions will have to be repeated every time the
court rules on a controversial law, and no amount of repetition
will make it convincing.
P . W . HOGG*

SEEING THROUGH THE DOUBLE-DUTCH OF CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY?-The House of Lords in Boardman v. Phipps' make
very clear the error in assuming that every profit or conflict between interest and duty necessarily renders a fiduciary accountable! Like the duty of care in the law of negligence, fiduciary
duties do not apply in the abstract.' There is the need-given that
a fiduciary relationship exists-to examine carefully the scope
of that relationship .' This is merely to recognize that the intensity
and therefore the perimeter of a fiduciary relationship will vary
et When Laskin J. was elevated to the position of Chief Justice a letter
in the correspondence column of The Globe and Mail, January 11th, 1974,
praised the appointment on the ground that "he is aware of the changing
role of women in society and convinced that our laws must reflect this
change" .
The Globe and Mail, September 29th, 1973.
°' Ibid.

* P. W. Hogg, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
1a [196712 A.C. 46.
Ibid ., at pp. 90-91, per Viscount Dilhorne; at pp. 100, 102-103, per
Lord Cohen ; at pp. 105, 109-110, per Lord Hodson ; at pp. 125-130, per
Lord Upjohn. See also the examples given by Wilberforce J., [19641 1
W.L.R. 993, at pp. 1009-1010, accepted by Lord Denning M.R., [1965] 2
W.L.R.
at pp. 860.
a See 839,
Smith Ltd. v. Smith, [1952] N.Z .L.R. 470, at p. 471 .
' As Frankfurter J., put it: "But to say that a man is a fiduciary only
begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry . To whom is he a
fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect
has he failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the consequences
of his deviation from duty?" S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp . (1943), 318 U.S. 80,
at pp. 85-86.
Similar is the analysis of Lord Upjohn in Boardman v. Phipps, supra,
footnote 1, at p. 127 which was recently applied by Roskill J., in Industrial
Development Consultants Ltd. v. Cooley, [197212 All E.R. 162, at p. 173 .
See generally Sealy, [19621 C.L.J. 69, at pp. 73-74.

